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Abstract The thin red line (TRL) is a theory about the semantics of future-contin-
gents. The central idea is that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the
presence of indeterminism. It is inspired by a famous solution to the problem of divine
foreknowledge associated with William of Ockham, in which the freedom of agents
is argued to be compatible with God’s omniscience. In the modern branching time
setting, the theory of the TRL is widely regarded to suffer from several fundamental
problems. In this paper we propose several new TRL semantics, each with differing
degrees of success. This leads up to our final semantics, which is a cross between
the TRL and supervaluationism. We discuss the notions of truth, validity and seman-
tic consequence which result from our final semantics, and demonstrate some of its
pleasing results. This account, we believe, answers the main objection in the literature,
and thus places the TRL on the same level as any other competing semantics for future
contingents.
Keywords Future contingents · Branching-time · Ockhamism · Thin red line ·
Supervaluationism
1 Introduction
The thin red line (or TRL) is a theory about the semantics of future-contingents. The
central idea is that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the presence
of (perhaps radical) indeterminism. It is inspired by a well known solution to the
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problem of divine foreknowledge associated with William of Ockham, in which the
freedom (and hence moral responsibility) of agents is argued to be compatible with
God’s omniscience. The original presentation of the modern theory is by Øhrstrøm
(1981, 1984), but it is widely held to suffer from fundamental problems (Belnap and
Green 1994; Belnap et al. 2001; Placek and Belnap 2010). The TRL theory has been
developed in several directions (McKim and Davis 1976; Braüner et al. 1998, 2000;
Øhrstrøm 2009), but each theory modifies the original in a way that deviates from Ock-
ham’s original insight, and its presentation in (Øhrstrøm 1981). We propose several
new TRL semantics, with differing degrees of success, each of which keeps the TRL
as unique and fixed. Our final account, the ‘supervaluational thin red line’ (or STRL),
answers the main Belnap-inspired objection that seemed to force theorists away from
the TRL. We present several pleasing results for the STRL semantics, showing that
it generates all the plausible Ockhamist validities and avoids a well-known problem
for supervaluationism presented by Willimson and Tweedle. With this begins our pro-
ject of placing the TRL on the same level as other competing semantics for future
contingents.
2 Ockhamism
William of Ockham (c. 1288–c. 1348) has been associated with an influential and
“widespread point of view” (Zanardo 1996, p. 1) about the semantics of the future-
tense in branching time. This might seem surprising, given that Ockham was a 14th
Century Franciscan friar and as such predates branching time or formal semantics
by about 600 years. We think of him because he wrote about the theological prob-
lem of Divine Foreknowledge, which has a strong similarity to the problem of future
contingents (perhaps it is precisely the same problem). He claims that God divinely
foreknows the future, while at the same time maintaining that we are free agents (with
moral responsibility). In very general terms, the TRL is a theory which tries to maintain
this conclusion (though in a somewhat more secular setting).
2.1 The problem
The problem of Divine Foreknowledge is a traditional theological problem, discussed
at length by Ockham in a book entitled Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and
Future Contingents (c. 1323, the relevant section is Question 1, section F). What
follows is a very simple reconstruction designed to highlight William of Ockham’s
general solution. The problem can be put very simply: if God already knows what
you are going to do tomorrow (i.e. if you are “predestinate”), then you are not free
to act otherwise. In order to avoid this conclusion, one seems to have to concede that
either agents are not free, or that God is not Omniscient. Ockham refuses to budge, and
denies neither of these central tenets of Christianity.1 There is a delicate interaction
1 This refusal to budge is indicative of Ockham’s obstinate character in general. For example, not long
after writing “Predestination”, Ockham was accused of heresy, most likely for a commentary on Lombard’s
“Sentences”. The story is that Ockham was summoned to Avignon to face an official papal commission,
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involving modality here, and to see it clearly we need to be careful. The problem has
to do with two of God’s supposed Divine Attributes: Omniscience and Infallibility;
the former meaning that God foreknows the future, and the latter meaning that He
cannot get it wrong.
We can put matters a little more formally (and a little less fluently) by saying:
Omniscience: If it will be that φ, then God foreknows that it will be that φ(Fφ →
KG Fφ).
Infallibility: If it is divinely foreknown that it will be that φ, then it is not possible
that it will not be that φ (KG Fφ → ¬♦¬Fφ).
This is equivalent to:
Infallibility2: If it is divinely foreknown that it will be that φ, then it is necessary
that it will be that φ (KG Fφ → Fφ).
Omniscience, Infallibility2 and hypothetical syllogism are sufficient to show that the
future is necessary:
Fφ → KG Fφ and KG Fφ → Fφ. Therefore, Fφ → Fφ.
The future is necessary and the freedom of will is just an illusion.
2.2 The solution
Ockham diagnoses a modal ambiguity in the argument. The following natural language
sentence-type, “If A then necessarily B”, can mean either of the following:
1. If A, then necessarily-B.
2. Necessarily, if A, then B.
According to Øhrstrøm (1984), this distinction has been articulated by many authors
throughout history. Notably, Anselm makes this distinction, calling (1) ‘antecedent
necessity’ and (2) ‘subsequent necessity’.2 Ockham’s message is that God’s infalli-
bility should be stated as follows:
It is necessary that if God foreknows that it will be that φ, then it will be that
φ : (KG Fφ → Fφ).
It is the implication that is necessary. This formulation expresses that God never
gets it wrong (he is infallible), but it doesn’t lead to the content of his knowledge
becoming necessary as a consequence.
God is necessarily omniscient, so (Fφ → KG Fφ) holds as well. Therefore,
every formula of the form KG Fφ is necessarily equivalent to the formula Fφ, so we
could reconstruct the argument by replacing the first with the second, giving us the
Footnote 1 continued
which found 51 charges against him. Although Pope John XXII stopped short of formally condemning
Ockham, this leniency did not stop the young Englishman from obstinately deciding that it was in fact
the Pope who was guilty of heresy. This episode eventually lead to Ockham’s excommunication from the
Catholic Church.
2 Anselm uses the same syntax for both and so mistakenly believes there to be two kinds of necessity
involved; one of the benefits of logical symbolism is to see this error.
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relatively harmless (Fφ → Fφ). The last formulation merely expresses the clichéd
expression “Que sera sera”, only adding a “Necessarily…” in front. But then, surely,
it is a modal logic tautology anyway, so that is absolutely fine.
2.3 Conclusion of Ockham
The philosophical message to be exported from Ockham’s solution is that God can
know the future, without that foreknowledge making the future events necessary. For
example, if God knows that you are going to sin tomorrow, then according to Ockham
it is still true that you might not sin. The content of God’s knowledge that “you will
sin tomorrow” is that although you are not under any compulsion to, and are free
to refrain from it, you just will. Because of the equivalence of God’s foreknowledge
and the truth of a prediction, the message is that there can be a truth about the future
which does not collapse to necessity or mere possibility; the ‘plain will’. It is a delicate
point that Ockham is making. The plain future tense is modally thicker than ‘possibly
might’, but modally thinner than ‘necessarily will’.
3 Prior meets Ockham
Ockham’s solution to the problem of future contingents is not entirely original. As we
saw, Anselm had very similar views. But, the reason we think of Ockham, rather than
Anselm, is because of Arthur Prior. In his classic book on tense logic, Past, Present
and Future (1967, Chap. 7) Prior discusses branching and Ockham’s views on future
contingents at the same time. The particular issue that Prior focuses on is not quite
the scope distinction from above, but something different. Prior focuses on the clash
between the intuitive thesis that the past is necessary, and sentences which have a
“trace of futurity about them.”
The idea that the past is necessary stems from the realisation that we cannot alter
the past. Nothing we can do now can effect the outcome of World War II. Now that the
Allies won, it is necessary that they won. A natural way to bring this idea into tense
logic is to insist that past tensed truths are necessary. However, consider the following
past tensed statement:
“That was my last cigarette.”
If true, it entails that I will not smoke in the future. But if it is past-tensed and true,
then it is necessarily true. This in turn entails that I will necessarily not smoke in the
future. But surely, even if I do not smoke in the future, it is not a necessary truth now
that I will not. Otherwise it would not be so hard to give up. So, past-tensed truths are
necessary truths, apart from the ones which have an explicit or implicit trace of the
contingent future about them. These must remain contingent.
To get this result, Prior used the branching model (or ‘matrix’) that Kripke had
suggested to him (see Prior 1967, p. 27). Formally, the branching-time (BT ) structure
is a pair F = 〈M,<〉 where M is a non-empty set, < is a transitive and asym-
metric relation defined on M which satisfies the conditions of backward linearity
(∀m, m1, m2((m1 < m ∧m2 < m) ⇒ (m1 ≤ m2 ∨m2 ≤ m1)), where m ≤ m′ means
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m < m′ ∨ m = m′) and historical connectedness (∀m1, m2∃m(m ≤ m1 ∧ m ≤ m2)).
Elements of a set M are possible moments which can be thought of as possible, instan-
taneous stages of the world. The symbol ‘<’ represents earlier-possibly later relation
defined on moments, m1 < m2 means that m1 is in the past of m2 and m2 is in a
possible future of m1. Both M and < are not only temporal but also inherently modal
notions which are meant to represent the interaction of possibility with time. We will
call the maximal linearly ordered subsets of M ‘histories’ as they correspond to entire
possible courses of history.
The language we are working with is a propositional language containing count-
able, infinite set of propositional variables V ar , temporal operators F and P , and
historical modalities  and ♦. Atomic propositions are thought of as simple, present
tensed declarative sentences, rather than ‘untensed’ or ‘tenseless’ (see Müller 2011).
Additionally, those atomic propositions have no traces of futurity, they are, so to say,
wholly about the present. The notion of valuation of propositional variables in BT -
structure F = 〈M,<〉 is understood as a function V : V ar → ℘(M). The BT -model
based on F is a pair M = 〈F, V 〉.
The particular novelty with this semantics was that Prior insisted that future tensed
formulae must be evaluated not just at a moment m, but also at a particular history h
passing through that moment (in every m/h pair, m ∈ h). In order to keep the seman-
tics compositional, all formulae are evaluated at such pairs. Here are the semantic
clauses for the tempo-modal propositional language:
Definition 1 (Formula φ is Ock-true in model M, at m/h pair)
1. M, m/h|Ock p iff m ∈ V (p) where p ∈ V ar ;
2. M, m/h|Ock¬φ iff it is not that M, m/h|Ockφ (M, m/h |Ockφ);
3. M, m/h|Ockφ ∧ ψ iff M, m/h|Ockφ and M, m/h|Ockψ ;
4. M, m/h|Ock Pφ iff ∃m′(m′ < m ∧ M, m′/h|Ockφ);
5. M, m/h|Ock Fφ iff ∃m′(m < m′ ∧ m′ ∈ h ∧ M, m′/h|Ockφ);
6. M, m/h|Ockφ iff ∀h′(m ∈ h′ ⇒ M, m/h′|Ockφ).
This semantics guarantees that we stop those past tensed formulae that have a trace
of futurity about them from being necessary when they shouldn’t be. This meant that
Prior’s reconstruction of Ockham’s position was successful.
The purely tense part of the resulting system, given these semantics, turned out
to be exactly the logic of linear time, and the purely modal part turned out to be
S5. The resulting logic is therefore rather conservative. These qualities have made this
semantics attractive to many philosophers and philosophical logicians, including Nuel
Belnap, Richmond Thomason, Anil Gupta, Tomasz Placek and Thomas Müller.
However, we feel uneasy about the history parameter of evaluation, and do not
want it to play a major role in the semantics of future contingents. But before we part
company with such esteemed philosophers, we will try to explain our dissatisfaction.
We do not present ‘knock-down’ arguments against the Priorian-Ockhamist seman-
tics, just interpretational difficulties. (This is not dissimilar to the way that Placek and
Belnap (2010, p. 22) describe their own anti-TRL arguments).
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3.1 Problems with the history parameter
The history parameter in Priorian-Ockhamism is a semantic parameter that needs to be
specified in order to give a truth value to a prediction of a future contingent. We accept
that there are no technical problems with how this parameter works, but we argue that
there are difficulties when trying to understand what this semantic parameter means.
The value has to be given somehow and a first thought is that it is fixed by reference
to some fact, or set of facts. But which facts? The obvious answer is: any set of facts
that includes the fact about which future is the actual one. However, proponents of
Priorian-Ockhamism strongly deny that there is any such fact; to them there is no such
thing as the actual future. So, we can’t simply give the history parameter the value of
the actual history, as there is none (as Belnap et al. urge). So it has to be given a value,
but any value given can only be arbitrary, or “prima facie”. But the truth-values of
predictions are not arbitrary; they relate to the states of affairs in the future. It might
be that, epistemically, because I don’t know the future, each is equivalent. But we are
not doing epistemic logic here, rather we are doing temporal logic, and what a given
agent knows or not should not affect the construction of our system.
Thomason (1970) makes a telling comment about Priorian-Ockhamism:
…this [Priorian-Ockhamist semantics] is an unstable view, for its import is that
statements in the future tense may be neither true nor false. In particular, they
will be neither true nor false unless a unique possible future is posited. Since we
may often be in situations in which we have made no suppositions concerning
which of a variety of possible futures will come about it should also often be
the case that certain statements in the future tense are neither true nor false.
(Thomason 1970, p. 271).
Thomason’s quote makes it seem like the history parameter is fixed by the facts about
which future the speaker of the sentence has ‘posited’. Burgess says the following:
The truth-value of a future tense statement depends on which branch we think
of as representing the course of events which is actually going to turn out to
happen. (Burgess 1979, p. 575, emphasis ours).
In the hands of Burgess, the process of ‘positing’ or ‘supposition’ seems to be
internal, as it depends on which history we “think of” as the right one. On this picture,
the history of evaluation parameter might stand for some kind of inner association we
make when we say predictions. So for example, I say “It will rain tomorrow” and, as
I do so, I think of a future leading from the present in which it does rain tomorrow.
This association makes the prediction true because it rains in the future of which I was
thinking. This seems to be the doctrine according to Burgess. We call this idea the
‘Inner Baptism’ approach. We do not believe that any version of the ‘Inner Baptism’
Priorian-Ockhamism can be correct. Consider the following scenario:
Samantha and Jonny are in a betting shop. Samantha picks a horse called ‘Knobbly
Knees’ which is scheduled to run in the next race, and places a bet. As she makes the
bet, she says to Jonny “Knobbly Knees will win,” and while she does so she makes
the ‘internal supposition’ to use a history in which he wins as the value of the history
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parameter. They sit and watch the race, only to see Knobbly Knees come last. Never-
theless, as a good Inner-Baptist, Sam maintains that she spoke the truth. “Who cares
what actually happened? My prediction was associated internally with a winning his-
tory, so what I said was true.” When she goes to collect her money, the bookie (quite
rightly) refuses to pay. This is because bookies do care about what actually happened,
and not about what she was thinking of at the time of the bet. It is what ‘actually
happens,’ and not any type of inner association, that decides whether the bet would
be paid out. Our first complaint then, is that it seems odd that bet payouts do not
correspond to the (Inner Baptist’s) truth of predictions. We think that if you make a
true prediction, then a bet about the content of the prediction should (perhaps later
on) also pay out. This intuitive idea about the relation between true predictions and
successful bets seems to be just incorrectly handled by Inner-Baptism. In fact, making
true predictions of future contingents is almost as easy as thinking that your prediction
is true.
Imagine that Jonny countered Sam’s prediction by saying “Knobbly Knees will
not win,” and that he associated his utterance with a future in which the horse loses.
Then, he and Sam will both have spoken the truth, even though they sound very much
like they have contradicted each other. We find this situation counter-intuitive. Our
complaint here is that it seems that only one of Sam or Jonny could have spoken the
truth, and the other falsity.
Belnap et al. (2001) present a more sophisticated version of Priorian-Ockhamism.
It should be made clear that Belnap et al. do not endorse a version of Inner Baptism.
They reject the idea that the history parameter can be fixed with reference to any ele-
ment of context, such as internal positing etc. It is more like the assignment of values
to individual variables; a parameter but not one given by context; it is an auxiliary
parameter.
Part of the novelty of this approach lies in their “Semantic Thesis 6–6” (ibid.,
p. 155), where “The coin will land heads” (without specifying the value of the history
parameter) is compared with “x is brindle” (without specifying the semantic value of
the variable x). Each are then claimed to have no truth-value, but for the simple reason
that they are underspecified. If we fully specify the variables required by the seman-
tics, the truth-value gaps go away (ibid., p. 156). This suggestion is made to increase
the similarity between the history and assignment parameters. This comparison is not
beyond question, however. Being told that “x is brindle” is clearly a useless thing to be
told. After being told it, you do not know which thing is brindle. Being told that “The
coin will land heads” just doesn’t seem similarly useless. It seems to be all you needed
to know (provided you trust the speaker) in order to confidently make a bet. Therefore,
to us, the claim that they should be treated as equally empty seems rather strange.
Belnap et al. are aware of the problem we are alluding to in this section, and suggest
a pragmatic (as opposed to semantic) solution. Their claim is basically that the seman-
tic treatment of the two sentences is the same, but the pragmatic treatment is different.
Roughly: “the coin will land heads” is assertable, in contrast to “x is brindle” which
isn’t (ibid., p. 157), precisely because saying the first, and not the second, brings the
speaker into a set of relationships with his audience; he is either ‘impugned’ or ‘vindi-
cated’ as a result of what happens (see Wilson’s contribution to this issue for discussion
of this). They say that this pragmatic element is what explains the uselessness of being
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told that “x is brindle”; it leads to neither vindication nor impugnment. In contrast, by
making the prediction, the speaker has entered into a (loose) set of relationships with
the audience (hence the need to specify that we ‘trust’ the speaker); they can blame
the speaker for getting it wrong (if it turns out to have been wrong), or they can praise
him for getting it right (in the other case).
To us, this move to pragmatics seems to be no help. We are concerned with the way
that truth-values are given to predictions of future contingents in Priorian-Ockhamism.
The basic problem is that utterances occupy single moments but many histories. Since
we have to have both to ascribe a truth-value to a prediction (according to Priori-
an-Ockhamism), there are many non-trivial ways in which we can evaluate a given
prediction. It can be true and false, at the same time, that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow. Appealing to pragmatics is just to change the subject, in our opinion. It is
as if Belnap et al. would have us consider the pragmatics of assertion involved in “α
-aserts-‘The coin will land heads’ ” while what we should actually be concerned with
is the semantics of “The coin will land heads.”
4 The thin red line
At this point, we follow the lead of Øhrstrøm (1984, p. 217); “It seems clear to me that
Ockham was not an Ockhamist (in Prior’s sense of the word). According to Ockham
the [history-independent] truth-value of Fp is a meaningful concept. We cannot know
the value (unless it is revealed), but God knows it.”
If Øhrstrøm is right, then to be a proper Ockhamist there could be nothing provi-
sional about the history parameter. This means that to construct the True Ockhamism
(TRL) we should have the notion of the ‘actual course of history’ as a structural feature
of the model, rather than as a parameter of evaluation. This seems all the better, given
the awkwardness of any attempt to understand the history parameter.
To construct a proper theory of True Ockhamism, therefore, we need to add to
the semantical models we are considering. The addition we make is a distinguished
history, called the thin red line (or TRL).
A TRL structure T is a pair 〈F, TRL〉, where F is a branching time structure and
TRL is a distinguished history of the model–the history which represents the actual
course of events through time. Notice that TRL is one particular history of the model,
it is not a functional notion usually used in the literature (e.g. McKim and Davis 1976;
Barcellan and Zanardo 1999; Braüner et al. 2000; Øhrstrøm 2009) which changes its
value depending on a point of the model. In this way we are faithful to Øhrstrøm (1981,
1984); i.e. the original TRL.
This modification of the structure results in some changes in syntax and semantics
of our language. The symbols  and ♦ are sometimes substituted by F andF respec-
tively. We include both F and F in the language since under some of the available
interpretations these two are not interdefinable. The letter F in F and F is meant
to indicate that these modalities are inherently ‘future-oriented’ ones. We substitute
them with the ordinary  and ♦ when the reference to the future is no longer essential.
Each time we provide the appropriate semantic definitions which specify the meaning
of the connectives.
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We are going to present a series of attempts to grasp the notion of the actual future.
All of them utilize the concept of TRL structure presented above. We present several
options, leaving (in our minds at least) the most promising candidate till last. We
decided to keep the ultimately unsuccessful attempts in the article for two reasons:
First, they are the initial things you would assume would work, but don’t. So, our
message is cautionary; we hope our negative results will save others the time of inves-
tigating those type of options. Secondly, they demonstrate the difficulties faced by
adherents of the TRL, and partly excuse the slight (sinful) relaxing of our principles
that comes with the final option.
In the next section we outline the basic TRL theory and history-independent seman-
tics, in order to introduce the objection we aim to face. We explain what we call the
‘conservative response’, which is little more than articulating the treatment of non-
actual predictions the basic theory gives. As it is clearly inadequate, we then motivate
our first option, ‘Would’; the second option is called the ‘Modal-Would’; the third is
the ‘Modal-Will’; and lastly we rest on the ‘Supervaluational-Will’.
5 Elementary history-independent semantics
The basic TRL semantics, found in Øhrstrøm (1981), is based on an idea that we need
to intimately bind the interpretation of the F operator with the TRL. So, “There will
be a sea battle” is true if there is a sea battle in the actual future. Since it is only the Fφ
truth clause which is dependent on the choice of the history, if we purge this particular
truth clause of the sinful history parameter, then we may attempt to cast aside the
history parameter as an element of an evaluation point altogether. (Which formally
means to get rid of h on the left side of ‘|’ symbol.) Definition 2 below provides a
natural semantics that gets across this idea. A TRL-model is a pair 〈T, V 〉, where T is
a TRL-structure and V : V ar → ℘(M).
Definition 2 (Formula φ is trl-true in TRL-model M, at moment m)
1. M, m|trl p iff m ∈ V (p) where p ∈ V ar ;
2. M, m|trl¬φ iff it is not the case that M, m|trlφ (M, m |trlφ);
3. M, m|trlφ ∧ ψ iff M, m|trlφ and M, m|trlψ ;
4. M, m|trl Fφ iff ∃m′(m′ > m and m′ ∈ TRL and M, m′|trlφ);
5. M, m|trl Pφ iff ∃m′(m′ < m and M, m′|trlφ);
6. M, m|trlF φ iff ∃m′(m′ > m and M, m′|trlφ);
7. M, m|trlF φ iff ∀h(m ∈ h ⇒ ∃m′(m′ ∈ h ∧ m′ > m ∧ M, m′|trlφ)).
Notice that these definitions not only bind F with TRL, but additionally render F
and F essentially tempo-modal operators. To evaluate a formula containing F or F
we need to take into account both a temporal factor (a future moment m) and modal
factor (the history in which the moment is situated). The intended meaning of F is
‘possibly in the future’ or simply ‘it might be that’ and F can be read as ‘necessarily
in the future’ or ‘it is inevitable that’. Simply put: modal operators look ‘sideways’
at other histories but also ‘forwards’ into the future. The future tense operator looks
only forwards, and only into the actual future.
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6 Problems for the TRL
So far so good, but Belnap et al. (2001) present this theory with various problems;
some conceptual, some ‘logical’. On the conceptual side, the claim is made that the
TRL entails determinism (see Thomason 1984; Belnap et al. 2001). We feel that this
objection is confused. The whole point of the TRL is that the actual future is contin-
gent. It is perfectly consistent in our TRL semantics to say “It will (actually) happen,
even though it might not,” and so we cannot see where the lack of indeterminism could
come from. ‘Real possibilities’ are present in our models. Just because you will actu-
ally win the lottery, does not make it necessary that you will. This is Ockham’s point.
Therefore we believe this objection is not really an objection; the TRL is conceptually
compatible with indeterminism.
On the more formal side, we face two main problems. The first problem is that the
TRL provides ‘no account’ of predictions made off the TRL. The second is that the
TRL has ‘problems with actuality.’ The first of these problems is largely formal, and
it is to this that we sacrifice the four proposals (Sects. 7.1–7.3 below), each of which
can account for predictions made off the TRL. The first three face difficulties, but we
believe that the final one gives a rather satisfactory treatment of non-TRL predictions.
This answers the objection of Belnap et al. that there is no satisfactory treatment of
such predictions. We say: Yes, there is. The charge that the TRL misconceives actuality
will be dealt with in a planned subsequent paper.
Let us first focus in more detail on the first of the aforementioned problems. Belnap
et al. say the following about the TRL theory:
The TRL theory sounds all right, but it is not. It has the ‘logical’ defect that it
gives no account whatsoever of predictive speech acts occurring at moments of
use that lie off the TRL and is by so much useless. (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162).
The theory, as it stands, presents only one course of events as actual, and the semantics
of the future tense requires that predictions be checked against later sections of the
TRL. If the moment of speech is off the TRL, then no later moments are in the TRL,
and so the theory seems to be of no help. Of course, it is not quite correct of Belnap
et al. to say that we have “no account whatsoever” of predictions off the TRL. Every
prediction outside the TRL is rendered false by the basic semantics. For any formula
φ, any TRL-model M and any moment m ∈ TRL,M, m |trl Fφ,M, m |trl F¬φ and
M, m |trl F(φ ∨¬φ). This account seems to be a self-evidently Bad Thing to Belnap
et al.
Perhaps the result becomes easier to accept if we keep in mind that the whole
point of introducing the TRL into the model was to represent the notion of the actual
future. Therefore, the meaning associated with the F operator, when bound to the TRL,
should be “it will actually be the case that.” Under this conservative interpretation of
the operator, we should no longer be surprised by the falsity of non-actual predic-
tions. Non-actual moments do not have actual futures, therefore no sentence about the
actual future should be true at these moments. We can simply say that the complaint
of Belnap et al. asks for what cannot be done.
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We believe that Belnap et al. would not be impressed with this reply. They think
that even at moments off the TRL, we should call some predictions true, and not call
them all false. The thought might be that even merely possible coins have to land either
heads or tails.3 The TRL theory seems to deny this.
There are two general ways in which this intuition can be cashed out. First, for all
m off the TRL either Fφ is true or F¬φ is true; either “there will be a sea battle” is
true, or “there will be no sea battle” is true. Second, we can simply require that, for
all m off the TRL, that F(φ ∨ ¬φ) is true; “there will be either a sea battle or no sea
battle” is true. Call the first the Strong Intuition and the second the Weak Intuition. It is
not entirely clear which of these two intuitions is motivating Belnap et al.’s complaint
here.
7 Solutions to the first problem
The core of Belnap et al.’s objection is the difficulty of giving an accurate account
of predictions made at non-actual moments. In natural language, such predictions are
often made by means of counterfactuals. The proper analysis of counterfactuals in
general, and in context of branching time semantics in particular, is a rather complex
issue (see e.g. Thomason and Gupta 1980; Placek and Müller 2007). Belnap is openly
sceptical about formal counterfactual connectives (see his contribution to this issue)
and so is plausibly read as not requiring that defenders of the TRL provide a full the-
ory of counterfactuals. Nonetheless, Ockhamism (which Belnap et al. endorse) does
provide an account of the truth value of predictions made at any point, and one which
doesn’t make them all false. In order to keep up with Belnap et al. (which would
be a self-evidently Good Thing), we intend to do the same; i.e. we will account for
predictions situated at moments not in the TRL (without rendering them all false),
but we will not attempt to provide a semantics for the counterfactual connective. We
intend to produce a sequel to this paper in which we will give the proper semantics
for the counterfactual connective which includes the TRL, and so we ask the reader to
suspend his or her worries that rely on counterfactuals.
7.1 Introducing “would”
Our aim in this section of this paper is quite modest. It is to find a way of giving non-
actual moments (at least some) true predictions. To begin with, we will keep the future
tense as it is, focused solely on the TRL and create a new, and somewhat artificial,
tense operator ‘would’. The idea is that ‘would’ handles predictions off the TRL. So,
if England score before half time, they ‘will’ go on to win the match. In contrast: had
England scored before half time, they ‘would’ have gone on to win. The distinction is
pretty clear, but the challenge is to find some plausible semantics for this new operator.
3 Nuel Belnap agreed with this interpretation in correspondence.
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7.1.1 To shift or not to shift
Belnap et al.’s objection involves a telling phrase:
“Had things gone otherwise”.
In Belnap et al.’s own theory, as we have seen, there is a mobile history parameter.
The phrase “Had things gone otherwise” means that we simply change the value of
the history parameter (and probably also the moment parameter). Braüner et al. (1998)
devise a modification of the TRL theory, in which there is a TRL for every point in the
tree. Obviously such a move is not available to us, puritan Ockhamists, but we need
to come up with a way of thinking of non-actual predictions, while keeping the TRL
fixed, not using a mobile history parameter and not invoking multiple TRL’s. There
don’t seem to be many options.
We first thought of using multiple models, each of which has a fixed TRL. Each
model is thought of as identical apart from the placement of the TRL. In short, the idea
was to evaluate predictions made at moments off the TRL by looking at corresponding
moments in other models through which the TRL does pass. In this way, it seems,
we should be able to avoid the mobile history parameter and get some purchase on
non-actual situations (where the TRL goes over a different history). This treatment
is rather non-standard, as the analysis of object-language sentences involves many
semantic models. Nonetheless, it is not a prima facie inconsistent move. However,
after incorporating the idea of many TRL-models into a formal semantic framework
for future contingents, it quickly becomes obvious that this treatment is equivalent to
the history-dependent Ockhamist semantics. There would be no ‘history’ parameter in
this semantics, but there would be a ‘ TRL-model’ parameter. Just like how the choice
of history was arbitrary in the history-dependent semantics, the choice of TRL-model
is also arbitrary. In terms of the semantic role that they play, the TRL-models are just
“histories in disguise,” and so this move is not going to help. In fact, it is considerably
more complicated than the history-dependent semantics, and so this theory may be
seen as even worse. There is a temptation to stray from the idea of the TRL but we
must resist it. Claiming that we should keep the TRL fixed while also playing around
with multiple TRL-models, is rather like professing to a monotheistic faith while also
praying to the pagan idols.
We believe that this lesson also concerns the ‘Molinist’ theories of Øhrstrøm,
Braüner and Hasle, in which the semantic model has multiple TRLs. We think that the
introduction of the alternative models, or multiple TRLs, was just an epicycle which
did not fix the problem but just pushed it one step further. In our opinion, instead of
pushing the difficulty away, one should openly face it at the very beginning.
7.1.2 Modal ‘would’
The lesson from the previous section is that we need to face Belnap et al.’s objection
in a way that does not, even unconsciously, render the TRL parameter mobile. We need
to keep it as a fixed, language-independent part of the model. The lesson is: do not
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introduce to your language any operator which requires you to switch the value of the
TRL parameter.
However, if we both keep the fixed and unique TRL and also do not introduce any
analogue of the history parameter at a point of evaluation, then it is very difficult to
give an account of the Strong Intuition. This said that at a non-actual moment, either
Fφ or F¬φ should be true. But it is hard to make one of them true, rather than the
other, without privileging a non-TRL history somehow.
As strict TRL puritans, we must resist the temptation to satisfy Belnap et al.’s strong
intuition. Our mantra here is that “there is just no such thing as the actual future of
a non-actual moment.” Our reason for this view is because of a shared metaphysical
conviction we both hold; it is the passage of time that resolves future contingents one
way or the other. At the same time, the passage of time, no matter how long-lasting,
will never resolve a non-actual future contingent in a similar manner. To the philo-
sophical logician who holds the view, there is therefore a requirement to treat actual
future contingents and merely possible future contingents differently. This idea may
be considered the ‘core’ of our view, and so, just to be clear, here is an example:
Imagine I hold in my hand a fair coin. I don’t flip the coin but I could have done so.
Moreover, I could have said, just before the possible toss, that the coin would show
heads. Belnap asks whether this possible statement is true of false. To us, because it
is a fair coin and it wasn’t flipped, it seems that this assertion cannot be counted as
true. Neither would it be true if we substitute ‘tails’ for ‘heads’. Each result is just
an unactualised possibility for a fair coin toss that never happened. This is how to
think of non-actual predictions of future contingents according to the TRL. In contrast
imagine that I will flip the coin, and in advance I assert “When I flip the coin, it will
show heads.” This assertion certainly can be counted as true or false, even in advance
of the coin flip (or so we say, and Ockham). The reason for the difference, of course,
is the presence of the TRL. It is because of this that we can say that the actual future
coin flip will ‘simply’ land heads (although it doesn’t have to).
For the reasons above therefore, we think that the rejection of the Strong Intuition is
conceptually defensible. Nonetheless, our opinion is that Weak Intuition cannot (and
should not) be so easily dismissed. The truth of the Weak Intuition is independent of
the belief that one of the possible futures is “quasi-actual”. It is grounded in the fact
that the ‘modal facts’ (i.e. which things are possible, inevitable etc.) can be discerned
without positing extra TRLs.
Imagine that the coin is rigged, so that it has heads on both sides. Again, I don’t
flip it, but I could have done it and I could have said in advance that the coin would
land heads. This possible assertion seems correct to us. This intuition can be accom-
modated in our semantics because it does not require that the non-actual moment has
a TRL passing through it. This coin’s landing heads is inevitable (i.e. happens in every
possible future of the possible flip) precisely because it is rigged. Rigged coins plainly
have different modal properties to fair coins, and it is this that allows us to make non-
actual predictions about them. Predictions like these are merely possible, but they are
not about future contingents and so they can have some kind of answer.
So, we want a definition of ‘would’ which doesn’t require moving the TRL. There
are two ways to express modal strength of “would” (W and W F ), which correspond
to whether or not to include the original TRL (via the F operator) in the definition:
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Definition 3 (‘It would be the case that φ’ is true at moment m)
1. M, m|trl Wφ iff M, m|trlF φ;
2. M, m|trl W Fφ iff (M, m|trlF φ or M, m|trl Fφ).
Both versions behave in the same way on merely possible moments; they inherit the
meaning of the future oriented necessity operator. However, they differ when evalu-
ated on the thin red line, W still takes the meaning of F while W F follows the actual
future. This distinction is subtle, but important.
Let us consider the following example to illustrate the difference. John and Anna
played a game of chess (on the TRL) and Anna won. However, these two are more or
less equally skilful chess players, both could have won. Michel, unaware of the fact
that the game was played, formulates the following judgement, which he considers to
be counterfactual: “Had John and Anna played chess, Anna would have won.” Is he
right?
Let us consider the moment m when John and Anna are beginning the game. At this
moment, it is true they both might win, and it is true that Anna will actually win. Then,
W F (Anna is winning) is true, but W(Anna is winning) is not. The intuition behind
W F is that if an antecedent of the counterfactual is actually true, then ‘would’ should
behave as ‘will’. On the other hand, W has a constant, modally strong meaning,
even for the actual moments. Since the intuitions about the truth of the sentences as
Michel’s above are shaky, we decided to include some investigation of both options.
7.1.3 Problems with modal ‘would(s)’
The construction of the modal would was based on what we think are good intuitions
about non-actual predictions; if the non-actual prediction is about something inevitable
it should be treated differently from non-actual predictions that are about contingent
things. Both of these are different from actual predictions. The purpose of explaining
the modal would’s semantic properties therefore was partly to highlight these Good
Things and make them clear. However, when you look at the logical consequences of
such a semantics, you find that it fails rather spectacularly. We include in the Appen-
dix (1) a list of these shortcomings. The list of difficulties which we point to is by no
means exhaustive. One could raise more objections of this sort. We call them “logical”
since they are mostly to do with counter-intuitive interaction between the connectives
of our language under the proposed semantics.
Take it from us, this theory is killed off completely by our complaints. The inter-
ested reader can consult the gruesome details of its death, but the more squeamish
(or less interested in going through the list of troublesome examples) can simply pass
on to our next idea.
7.2 Modal ‘will’
One way around some of the troubles pointed to in the previous section is to modify
the meaning of the future connective F so that it gets the meaning which was previ-
ously reserved for W F . We call this the ‘modal-will’. This move allows us to retire
the ‘would’ operator completely. The ‘modal-will’ semantics for F is as follows:
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Definition 4 (‘It will be the case that φ’ is true at moment m)
M, m|trl Fφ iff ((∃m′ m′ > m ∧ m′∈TRL ∧ M, m′|trlφ) or M, m|trlF φ)
The idea here is that ‘it will be that φ’ is true at m iff either m is in the TRL, and φ is
true later in the TRL, or m is not in the TRL and φ is inevitable at m. The F operator
is thus enriched to be sensitive to both modal and TRL notions.
The ‘philosophical’ flaw of this solution is that the semantics of F is no longer so
tightly entangled with the thin red line, and so we lose some of the purity which was
provided by the strict interpretation. This operator can no longer be interpreted simply
as ‘actually will’ as its role is no longer to simply refer to the unique and distinguished
future which is ahead of us, as it also refers to the settled future of non-actual moments.
However, the gain is quite significant. First of all, we do not need to introduce
an independent ‘would’ operator which takes care of predictions made at non-actual
moments. The semantics of ‘will’ is sufficiently rich to cover such cases. As a result,
we can consent to the thesis that ‘would’ is simply a superficial, grammatical mod-
ification of ‘will’ and not an independent operator, which seems intuitively right to
us.
By the same token, we do not give up on our claim that actual and non-actual pre-
dictions should be treated differently. This semantics respects our idea that to assess
the truth value of an actual sentence about the future one just needs to (wait and)
see what the actual future is like, while the assessment of the truth value of the non-
actual prediction demands something different—namely reasoning about what would
be possible and what would be necessary at this non-actual moment. Secondly, accep-
tance of this new definition of F rescues us from most of the intuitive difficulties we
discussed above and which resulted from assenting to the strict, puritan reading of
future operator.
The problems (cf. Appendix (1). Replace WF with F .) we are left with are:
5,6,7,12,13, plus G is not the dual for F and also the quasi-deterministic Fφ → F φ is
always true off the TRL. If this was the end of the line (and at one point, we thought it
was), then there might not be a future for the thin red line. Luckily we devised another
tactic.
7.3 Supervaluational thin red line
Our last semantic proposal gives away even more of our philosophical chastity with
respect to the TRL. But in advance, we get a semantics which we believe to be very
accurate in precisely describing the language of an indeterminist who believes in the
actual future. Regardless of our sinful digression from the pure theory, our final idea is
still very strongly pervaded with the idea of the distinguished, actual course of events,
and so is rightly to be called true Ockhamist theory; a genuine TRL theory.
We are giving away a part of our general attitude since we appeal to the notion of
truth value at the moment/history pairs; the very notion we argued against in Sect. 3.1!
However, we do it only provisionally, as a mean of arriving at the final, history inde-
pendent semantics. So we use it only as a technical tool do define our TRL semantics
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which itself is independent of the history parameter. We are essentially still exploiting
the distinction between the different ways of treating actual predictions of future con-
tingents and non-actual ones which we have built up so far in this paper. What we add
here, is the supervaluational treatment of truth into the picture. In exchange for the
slackening of our principles that this move entails, we can fix the logical faults of
the previous approaches. The resulting semantics, in our opinion, accurately mimics
the intuitions we have about the interaction of tense, possibility and actuality.
The aforementioned, provisional reference to the history parameter enables us to
return to the well known basic tempo-modal language and to appeal in our semantics
to the Ockhamist notion of truth (Definition 1). Now, the TRL-truth and TRL-falsity
of a formula are defined as follows:
Definition 5 ( TRL-truth; TRL-falsity)
We say that formula φ is TRL-true in TRL-model M, at moment m (M, m|T RLφ) iff
∀h(m ∈ h ⇒ M, m/h|Ockφ) or M, m/TRL|Ockφ
We say that formula φ is TRL-false in TRL-model M, at moment m (M, m=|T RLφ)
iff
∀h(m ∈ h ⇒ M, m/h |Ockφ) or M, m/TRL |Ockφ
What this says is that at m, it is true that φ iff either every m/h pair makes φ true, or
if the m/TRL makes φ true. Formula φ is false iff either every m/h pair makes φ false,
or if it is false on m/TRL. A formula lacks a truth value otherwise. Evidently, a for-
mula φ is TRL-false iff its negation is TRL-true (M, m =|T RL φ iff M, m|T RL¬φ).
Notice that the definition borrows from the definition of the weak Modal Would and
the Modal Will the idea of making the definition sensitive to concerns that require
quantifying over histories and also (if it is present) to the TRL. So this last idea is a
development of the previous two ideas. Notice that the clause for truth and falsity is
disjunctive; either it is super-true (à la Thomason) OR it is true on the TRL. The second
disjunct is what we add to a standard supervaluational account of truth in branching
time (Thomason 1970, 1984).
Clearly our treatment differs from Thomason’s in some crucial respects. First of all,
the notion of TRL plays a role in defining the truth and falsity of the formulae. Hence,
it is not the case that all the histories are “prima facie” as Prior put it; one of them
is special. This ensures our Ockhamist credentials. Second, it very closely mimics
our intuitions about the different status of actual and non-actual predictions that we
described above. Each single prediction actually made (i.e. made on the TRL) is either
true or false at the moment at which it is being made, future contingents included. In
contrast, the prediction Fφ can be considered true or false at a non-actual moment
m only if the state of the world at the moment m renders either φ or ¬φ inevitable;
otherwise, it has no truth value whatsoever. In our opinion it imitates well our ordinary
intuitions. Belnap et al.’s complaint was that in the original theory, predictions made
at non-actual moments are all false. Now, predictions made about settled truths at
non-actual moments are true (as they should be) and predictions about contingents are
neither true nor false. This also seems right. This is why there is no answer to which
way the possible fair coin would have landed. Importantly, we no longer face the
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technical difficulties associated with the modal-would or the modal-will. We believe
therefore that this semantics is the right way to go when addressing Belnap et al.’s
complaints about non-actual predictions.
Note that the intended interpretation of M, m|T RLφ, where m is off the TRL, is
not “had m been actual, then φ would have been true” (which is a subjunctive con-
ditional), but something like “m is the actual world’s potential in which φ happens.”
This is not to dogmatically rule out subjunctive conditionals, but just to say that the
meta-language interpretation of the evaluation of a formula off the TRL should not be
subjunctive by default. If one wants an account of subjunctive conditionals, then the
task would be to enrich the object language to contain a counterfactual operator, not
impose it as a reading of the basic evaluation of non-subjunctive formulae (such as
atomic propositions off the TRL).
Let us end with a few comments on the formal properties of the semantic definitions
we have just proposed.
7.3.1 Validity
Part of the quarrel about the TRL consisted in finding various “logical” difficulties
for different versions of the TRL semantics. These difficulties usually took a form of
observations that some intuitively valid formulae are not valid in a given TRL semantics
(the TRL-invalidities discussed in the literature contain for example: Fφ∨ F¬φ, φ →
H Fφ, F Fφ → Fφ, and F♦φ → ♦Fφ, (cf. e.g. Belnap and Green 1994; Barcellan
and Zanardo 1999; Braüner et al. 2000; Belnap et al. 2001; Øhrstrøm 2009). All of
these examples are Ockhamist-valid which seems to privilege (at least “logically” or
“linguistically”) the Ockhamist approach to logic of indeterminate future. The notions
of validity we use here are the standard ones:
Definition 6 (TRL validity) Formula φ is TRL valid in a TRL-structure T = 〈M,<,
TRL〉 (T|T RLφ) iff for every model M = 〈M,<, TRL, V 〉 based on T and every
moment m ∈ M,M, m|T RLφ.
Definition 7 (Ockhamist validity) Formula φ is Ockhamist valid in a BT -structure F
(F|Ockφ), if it is true in every BT-model M, at every moment/history pair m/h.
These notions of validity can be naturally generalized to classes of appropriate struc-
tures.
Our proposal gets the better of the previously mentioned “logical” problems since:
Fact 1 For arbitrary BT -structure F = 〈M,<〉 and TRL-structure T = 〈M,<, TRL〉
based on F:
F|Ockφ ⇒ T|T RLφ
Proof See Appendix (2a). unionsq
Unfortunately, the converse does not hold in general.
Fact 2 There is TRL-structure T=〈M,<, TRL〉, BT -structure F=〈M,<〉, and for-
mula φ such that:
T|T RLφ and F |Ockφ
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Proof See Appendix (2b). unionsq
However, if we generalize the notion of validity to the level of all TRL and BT -
structures, the two notions are equivalent. In fact, the equivalence holds even at the
lower level of generalization:
Fact 3 Let F = 〈M,<〉 be a BT structure and T a collection of TRL structures
“based on” F (i.e. T : = {T : T = 〈M,<, h〉 for some history h in 〈M,<〉}), then for
any formula φ:
T|T RLφ ⇔ F|Ockφ
Proof See Appendix (2c). unionsq
7.3.2 Semantic consequence
Another concept we want to discuss is that of semantic consequence. It is particularly
important since lots of arguments against supervaluationism available in the litera-
ture (e.g. Timothy Williamson 1994; Tweedale 2004) are focused on counter-intuitive
results of the acceptance of supervaluational version of semantic consequence.4
We believe that the supervaluationist, against Williamson’s (1994, p. 152) warning,
should accept the so-called “local” notion of semantic consequence. The TRL superval-
uationst is no exception. In our case, the local semantic consequence is the Ockhamist
one (just as the ‘local’ truth is the Ockhamist).
Definition 8 (Local semantic consequence) Let F = 〈M,<〉 be a BT -structure, and
 a set of formulae. We say that formula φ is a semantic consequence of  in a structure
F (|OckF φ) iff for every BT -model M based on F:
∀m∀h (∀ψ ∈  M, m/h|Ockψ ⇒ M, m/h|Ockφ)
More generally |Ockψ iff |OckF ψ for arbitrary F.
The first advantage of this approach is that it preserves all the classical rules of infer-
ence. Moreover, the notions of semantic consequence and implication are very closely
connected (φ|Ockψ iff |Ockφ → ψ). Another benefit of this definition, often unno-
ticed in the discussion of supervaluationism, is that it preserves a natural analogy
between the notions of truth and consequence. If ‘super-truth’ is defined in terms of
truth at every precisification, then ‘super-consequence’ should be derived from con-
sequence at every precisification.
We should notice though, that the local definition of semantic consequence given
above is not always accepted in the context of supervaluationism. The particularly
common, global alternative is:
Definition 9 (Global supervaluational consequence) Let F = 〈M,<〉 be a BT -struc-
ture, and  a set of formulae. We say that formula φ is a global supervaluational
semantic consequence of  in a structure F iff for every BT -model M based on F:
4 We would like to thank Prof. Fabrice Correia and an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to
various aspects of Williamson’s and Tweedale’s arguments and their possible impact on our endeavour.
123
Synthese (2012) 188:117–142 135
∀m(∀ψ ∈ ∀h M, m/h|ψ ⇒ ∀h M, m/h|φ)
In the context of BT , such definition was endorsed by Thomason (1970). Someone
who believes that this is an accurate supervaluational definition of semantic conse-
quence might urge that the TRL version should be an analogous, global one.
Definition 10 (Global TRL consequence) Let T = 〈M,<, TRL〉 be a TRL-structure,
and  a set of formulae. We say that formula φ is a global TRL-semantic consequence
of  in a structure T (|G−TRLT φ) iff for every TRL model M based on T:
∀m(∀ψ ∈  M, m|T RLψ ⇒ M, m|T RLφ)
An interesting fact about the global TRL-consequence is that it behaves consider-
ably better than its supervaluational cousin. To see it, let us remember that Timothy
Williamson (1994) famously argued against the supervaluational approach, in the con-
text of vagueness. One of his complaints was very general in nature. He showed that
the supervaluational notion of semantic consequence leads to unnatural conclusions,
even to, “in a sense a violation of classical propositional logic” (1994, 151). The
problem stems from the supervaluationist’s preference for ‘super-truth’ (i.e. truth on
all admissible precisifications). According to Williamson, the type of semantic con-
sequence interesting for supervaluationist, is the global one, i.e. the preservation of
super-truth. He intends to show that there are argument forms which, while being
locally valid, are not globally valid. He shows that the inference rules of contraposi-
tion, conditional proof, argument by cases, and reductio ad absurdum are not valid
given the supervaluational notion of semantic consequence. In our case, ‘super-truth’
is ‘history-independent truth’, and the claim would be that these inference rules are
not history-independently valid. Pleasingly, our TRL-supervaluationism does not suf-
fer from these problems. The TRL actually comes to the rescue, as we shall go on to
demonstrate.
We will explain one of the arguments to give the reader a sense of the problem, and to
see how we escape from it. Contraposition says that if φ|ψ , then ¬ψ |¬φ. The global
supervaluational version of this argument doesn’t always work though. For instance,
if we substitute ‘p’ for ‘φ’ and ‘Def ini tely : p’ for ‘ψ’, then p | Def ini tely : p
holds while ¬Def ini tely : p|¬p does not hold (just because it isn’t definitely the
case, doesn’t mean it isn’t the case). This constitutes a counter-example to contraposi-
tion, so contraposition is not a law of metalogic of standard supervaluationism. These
results apply mutatis mutandis, to Thomason’s (1970) semantics for indeterministic
time. In this case, we can (globally) infer Fφ from Fφ, but we cannot infer ¬Fφ
from ¬Fφ. Therefore, Thomason’s version of supervaluationism is vulnerable to
Williamson’s attack.
In the TRL version of global consequence however, the problem does not arise.
Remember that in our case, ‘super-truth’ is the history-independent truth pro-
posed in Definition 5. Unlike Thomason, we allow that ∃M∃m (M, m|T RLφ and
M, m |T RLφ). This is a consequence of the second disjunct in the clause defin-
ing TRL-truth; the sea-battle might only happen on the TRL and no other branch. In
this situation, the prediction is history-independently true, but the sea battle is not
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inevitable. It means that, in our account, Williamson cannot make the first step of
his argument (φ|G−TRLφ does not hold in general). The contingent sea-battle is
a counter-example to this schema. The way of avoiding each of Williamson’s three
other attacks is the same; each time it is the difference that the TRL makes which helps
out (see Chap. 5 of Williamson’s book “Vagueness”, especially pages 151–152, for
descriptions of the other arguments).
Another problem for the supervaluationist notion of global consequence was raised
by Tweedale (2004) who noticed that φ,♦ψ |♦(φ ∧ ψ) is a valid inference rule in
standard supervaluationism. It is a bad result since if we substitute Fp for φ and ¬Fp
for ψ we get that Fp,♦¬Fp|♦(Fp ∧ ¬Fp). So, we can infer a logical impossibil-
ity from logically possible set of assumptions. Again, the global TRL analogue avoids
this problem, φ,♦ψ |G−TRL♦(φ ∧ ψ) is false. To see that, just imagine that φ is a
future contingent true at m ∈ TRL, then we have that m|T RLφ, m|T RL♦¬φ but
m |T RL♦(φ ∧ ¬φ) (we even have that m|T RL¬♦(φ ∧ ¬φ)).
The fact that our TRL semantics defends itself against these arguments seems to
be a benefit of our theory. It is also pleasing to see that it is the presence of the TRL
that comes to the rescue. However, despite the global TRL consequence relation gets
around the problems that the ordinary global supervaluationist consequence relation
suffers, we are reluctant to lend our name to it and we still prefer the local notion.
Our reason stems from the observation that even though the arguments, as stated in
the literature, do not harm our proposal, they can be reformulated in an arguably less
persuasive, but still quite severe form. Our semantics avoids the standard problems of
supervaluationism because it works at some moments in non-supervaluational manner.
Nonetheless, we need to remember that at all moments outside the TRL the seman-
tics is entirely supervaluational. One might try to exploit its partially supervaluational
character and reconstruct the arguments in a moment-oriented fashion:
Definition 11 (Global TRL semantic consequence at moment m) Let T=〈M,<,
TRL〉 be a TRL-structure and let m ∈ M . We say that φ is a global semantic con-
sequence of a set of formulae  in structure T, at moment m (|G−TRLT,m φ) iff for
every TRL-model M = 〈M,<, TRL, V 〉 based on T we have that
∀ψ ∈  M, m|T RLψ ⇒ M, m|T RLφ
It is not the notion often met in the literature, but one can give it some intuitive
reading. It encodes what follows from what at a given point of a structure, indepen-
dently of how the valuation function works. Since our language is tensed and the
structure might differ from point to point, this notion might be helpful. For example,
at any maximal moment m of a structure T, we have that F(φ ∨ ¬φ)|G−TRLT,m ψ for
arbitrary ψ even though F(φ ∨ ¬φ) |G−TRLF ψ . Importantly, this notion of semantic-
consequence-at-a-moment enables us to exploit the supervaluational characteristics
of non-actual moments and establish moment-dependent arguments à la Williamson
or Tweedale. For example, for some m outside TRL of a structure T : φ|G−TRLT,m φ,
but ¬φ |G−TRLT,m ¬φ and Fp,♦¬Fp|G−TRLT,m ♦(Fp ∧ ¬Fp). These arguments do
not seem to be as strong as their more general versions, but they might still be found
worrisome.
123
Synthese (2012) 188:117–142 137
To sum up, the notion of local semantic consequence that we accept is free of logi-
cal charges against supervaluationism found in the literature. Additionally, the global
version of TRL semantic consequence is untouched by arguments as stated which is a
fair result. It is important to stress that it is the existence of TRL that takes the wind
out of the critics’ sails. Only a quite unusual moment-dependent modification of the
notion of semantic consequence raises some worries.
7.3.3 Truth operator(s)
There is always considerable amount of worry while introducing ‘It is true that’ and
‘It is false that’ operators. In our case, the problem does not consist in a danger of
semantic paradoxes but in uncertainty of the intended interpretation of these operators.
Since there are two levels of semantic analysis—bottom level of history-dependent
truth and top level of history-independent truth—there are two competing alternatives
for how to understand the truth (and falsity) operator.
Let us first discuss the option that attempts to mimic the top level notion of true on
the bottom semantic level. The semantic clause is as follows:
Definition 12 (‘It is true that φ’ is true at m/h) Let φ be a formula and M a TRL-
model, then:
M, m/h|Ock T rφ iff M, m/TRL|Ockφ, if m ∈ TRL, or
∀h′(m ∈ h′ ⇒ M, m/h′|Ockφ), if m ∈ TRL.
We define ‘It is false that’ (Fl) as Flφ := T r¬φ; and ‘It is undetermined that’ (Und)
as Undφ := ¬T rφ ∧ ¬Flφ.
There are some seemingly pleasing consequences of such defined notions. For example
we have that for every m ∈ TRL and every formula φ, m|T RL T rφ ∨ Flφ, while for
every future contingent evaluated at m ∈ TRL, we have that m|T RLUndφ. However,
the controversial outcomes far outgrow the merits.
The first set of problems has to do with the semantic consequence relation. In the
previous section we accepted the ‘local’ notion of semantic validity (Definition 8), we
argued however that our theory can be combined with the global notion of semantic
consequence (Definition 10) and, contrary to classical supervaluationism, it does not
generate troublesome results. It was only a moment-dependent notion of global seman-
tic consequence (Definition 11) which has shown to cause some problems. However,
if we endow our basic-level semantics with above-defined truth operator, we import
the problems of the global supervaluational consequence to the global TRL conse-
quence. For example φ|G−TRLT rφ always holds while ¬T rφ|T RL¬φ does not;
similarly, φ, Und¬φ|T RLUnd(φ ∧ ¬φ) is true. As a result, it seems that either the
global notion of semantic consequence or the truth operator defined above needs to
be abandoned.
Another set of problems is generated by the fact that T r behaves differently at
actual and non-actual moments. The consequences are quite bizarre. For example,
for some models and some moments out of the TRL the following formulae are not
true:
• T r(φ ∨ ψ) → (T rφ ∨ T rψ);
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• φ ↔ T rφ;
• T rφ ∨ T r¬φ;
• FT rφ → T r Fφ;
• T rφ ∧ H T r Fφ.
All of them behave well at any m ∈ TRL, however even at some m ∈ TRL we have that
m|T RL♦(φ ∧ ¬T rφ). Part of the oddity of these formulae can be explained away
by different status of actual and non-actual moments but probably not all of it. What
is even more unsettling is that the meaning of the language seems to change from one
point to another. In particular, the meaning of the operator “It is true that” is quite
different depending on whether it operates in actual or non-actual circumstances. As
a result, it seems for example that T-schema (φ ↔ T rφ) or bivalence (T rφ ∨ Flφ)
are only contingently true; they hold in the actual world only. This is an idea which
we feel reluctant to accept. What distinguishes actual from non-actual moments is the
manner in which we can asses truth value of formulae and not the meaning of the
language. Consequently, we believe that the aforementioned definition of truth should
be rejected altogether.
Since we want to keep the meaning of the truth operator fixed, we prefer to define it
in a unified manner throughout the whole domain. Consequently, we decided to accept
the following truth operator:
Definition 13 (‘It is true that φ’ is true at m/h) Let φ be a formula and M a TRL-
model, then:
M, m/h|Ock T rφ iff M, m/h|Ockφ.
Operator ‘It is false that φ’ is defined as Flφ := ¬T rφ.
It is a definition proposed already by Thomason (1970) and it is hard to imagine a
more straightforward and intuitive one. It simply says that the truth conditions of T rφ
are exactly those of φ. Preceding the formula with the phrase “It is true that” simply
does not distort its meaning at all. By the same token, “It is false that” behaves just as
negation which distinguishes it from the notion given by Definition 12.
The generalization to the top level does not change the natural features of this def-
inition. As far as semantic consequence is concerned, the incorporation of the truth
operator into our semantics is no longer harmful. In particular, none of Williamson’s
or Tweedale’s counterarguments apply to the global notion of TRL consequence, so it
regains its advantage over traditional supervaluationism in this respect.
By the same token, the intuitive validities are restored. All of the troublesome formu-
lae above, T r(φ ∨ψ) → (T rφ ∨ T rψ), φ ↔ T rφ, T rφ ∨ T r¬φ, FT rφ → T r Fφ,
and T rφ ∧ H T r Fφ are always true. In particular, the alethic version of the Weak
Intuition (T rφ ∨ Flφ) is valid, which we find a pleasing result. If the truth operator
does not change the truth conditions of the formula itself and falsity operator functions
just as the negation, it would be quite bizarre to universally accept φ∨¬φ and to reject
T rφ ∨ Flφ. Evidently, for an arbitrary moment—actual or not—we can justly assess
that a contingent statement is either true or false. The difference between the actual
and non-actual moment consist in the fact that at the former, but not at the latter we
can assess which of these two ways it is.
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8 Conclusion
Belnap et al. presented the original thin red line theory with various objections. In this
article we have focused on one in particular: how to account for predictions made off
the TRL. Our supervaluational-TRL theory gives the following account of predictions
made off the TRL; if the prediction is about something inevitable then it is true, if
it is about something contingent it is neither true nor false. On the TRL, of course,
predictions of contingents can be simply true. The gappiness that comes with super-
valuations is restricted to the non-actual moments—the thought being that there are
no actual futures of non-actual moments. This sensitivity to the TRL gives our version
of supervaluationism advantages that other versions lack. We plan to address the other
outstanding problems for the TRL, including treatment of the proper two-place coun-
terfactual connective and treatment of an ‘actually’ operator, in subsequent papers. So
far though, we have addressed the problem of non-TRL predictions, and presented our
answer in formal semantics. We hope, therefore, for this to be the beginning of a new
future for the thin red line.
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Appendix
(1) Problems with modal ‘would(s)’
The following is a fragmentary list of “logical” problems with the ‘modal would’, from
Sect. 7.1.2. We list various counter-intuitive consequences of the proposed semantics,
which can be naturally divided into the groups depending on some properties of an
evaluation point:
(a) Off the TRL, for all m, for all M:
1. M, m |trl Fφ, even if φ is ψ ∨ ¬ψ , i.e. M, m |trl F(ψ ∨ ¬ψ);
2. M, m|trl Gφ (G : = ¬F¬);
3. M, m|trl Fφ ↔ F¬φ;
4. M, m|trl Fφ → F ¬φ.
(b) Off the TRL, for some m, for some M:
5. M, m |trl W F (φ ∨ ψ) → (W Fφ ∨ W Fψ);
6. M, m|trlφ ∧ ¬H W Fφ;
7. M, m |trl W Fφ ∨ W F¬φ (even though W Fφ ∨ ¬W Fφ is valid. Clearly then,
W F¬φ and ¬W Fφ are not equivalent);
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8. M, m |trlF φ → Fφ (even though on TRL it works fine:
M, m|trlF φ → Fφ → F φ).
(c) On the TRL, for some m for some M’:
9. M, m |trl Fφ → Wφ
10. M, m|trl Fφ ∧ F φ ∧ ¬F Fφ
(d) For some m, for some M:
11. M, m |trlφ → H Wφ. But the weaker version φ → H¬W¬φ still holds.
12. M, m |trlF φ → φ
13. M, m|trlF ¬φ ∧F φ
Additionally, F and F are not duals. The dual of F is a “weak” G which says
that “it is possible that it always is going to be the case that” and the dual of F is a
“strong” G saying that “it is necessarily always going to be the case that.”
(2) Ockhamist validity and TRL validity
(a) Ockhamist validity implies TRL validity
Proof The proof is a straightforward consequence of the notion of Ockhamist truth
(Definition 1), supervaluational TRL-truth (Definition 5) and validity (Definitions 6
and 7).
Assume that φ is Ockhamist valid in a structure F. This means that for any
moment/history pair m/h and any model M based on F,M, m/h|Ockφ. Now, it
is sufficient to analyse the notion of truth we are adopting in Definition 5 to notice
that for every TRL-model N based on T and every moment m,N, m|T RLφ. Hence,
φ is TRL-valid. unionsq
(b) TRL validity does not imply Ockhamist validity
The counterexample is not that easy to find. Our definitions guarantee that for any TRL-
model N = 〈M,<, TRL, V 〉 and any m ∈ TRL, if N, m|T RLφ, then in BT -model
M = 〈M,<, V 〉 “underlying” N, for any h such that m ∈ h,M, m/h|Ockφ. Addi-
tionally, if m ∈ TRL, then N, m|T RLφ implies that M, m/TRL|Ockφ. Therefore, a
counter-example can be found only at m/h pairs such that m ∈ TRL and h = TRL.
We found such counterexample. Let us consider a rather unusual TRL-structure T such
that the ordering < is dense on the TRL and it is also dense “outside the TRL” (i.e.
∀m1, m2((m1 /∈ TRL ∧ m2 /∈ T RL ∧ m1 < m2) ⇒ ∃m3 m1 < m3 < m2)). Now,
assume that there is at least one discrete jump from the TRL; i.e. that the following con-
dition holds ∃m1, m2(m1 ∈ TRL ∧m2 /∈ T RL ∧m1 < m2 ∧¬∃m3 m1 < m3 < m2).
In such a peculiar structure it would be TRL-valid that T|T RL Fφ → F Fφ even
though in the underlying BT -structure F,F |Ock Fφ → F Fφ (to see that, we just
need to pick a moment m on the TRL and a moment n ∈ h immediately after m
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outside the TRL and assume that M, n/h|Ockφ and n is the only such moment in h
then M, m/h |Ock Fφ → F Fφ). This TRL-structure generates additional problems:
even though in our structure T|T RL Fφ → F Fφ,T |T RL H(Fφ → F Fφ), so the
latter is not a global TRL semantic consequence (see Definition 10) of the former.
Interestingly, if Pφ → P Pφ is valid in TRL-structure T = 〈M,<, TRL〉, then
relation < is dense. To see this, assume otherwise, i.e. (a) T|T RL Pφ → P Pφ and
(b) < is not dense, that is, ∃m1∃m2(m1 < m2 ∧ ¬∃m3 m1 < m3 < m2). Now,
consider a model N = 〈M,<, TRL, V 〉 such that V (q) = {m1} for some q ∈ V ar .
Finally, examine two possible cases:
• m2 ∈ TRL. Since T|T RL Pφ → P Pφ, we have that N, m2|T RL Pq → P Pq. By
Definition 5, this implies that N, m2/TRL|Ock Pq → P Pq. Since, V (q) = {m1}
and m1 < m2, we have that N, m2/TRL|Ock Pq which implies (by Definition 1)
thatN, m2/TRL|Ock P Pq. It follows that∃m′ m′ < m2 andN, m′/TRL|Ock Pq.
Since V (q) = {m1}, we have that m1 < m′ < m2 which contradicts assumption
(b).
• m2 /∈ TRL. Again, we have that N, m2|T RL Pq → P Pq. Consequently,
N, m2/h|Ock Pq → P Pq, for arbitrary h such that m ∈ h. Then, we pick
any such h and reason just as in the previous case to derive contradiction with (b).
So, there is an asymmetry between P and F in our semantics; in particular Fφ → F Fφ
is a global TRL semantic consequence of Pφ → P Pφ (consult Definition 10), but
the converse does not hold5.
(c) Generalized TRL-validity does imply Ockhamist validity
Proof The right to left implication is again a simple consequence of definitions. The
converse is very easy to prove as well. Let us assume, for reductio, that for some
formula φ, T|T RLφ and F |Ockφ. It means that there is a model M = 〈F, V 〉, a
moment m, and a history h such that M, m/h |Ockφ. Now, let us consider the TRL-
structure T ∈ T such that the history h is the T’s TRL and a model N = 〈T, V 〉, which
valuation function is the same as the one in M. Since, M, m/h |Ockφ and h is N’s
TRL, it follows from our definitions that N, m |T RLφ and as a result T|T RLφ which
contradicts our assumption. unionsq
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